Diagnosis and salvation: revolution, history and Augustine in Eric Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy by Cristaudo, WA
Title Diagnosis and salvation: revolution, history and Augustine inEric Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy
Author(s) Cristaudo, WA
Citation The 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociaiton (APSA), Washington, DC., 2-5 September 2010.
Issued Date 2010
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/136374
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
1 
 
―Diagnosis and Salvation: Revolution, History and Augustine in Eric Voegelin and 
     Rosenstock-Huessy.‖ 
 
  Introduction 
 If I may depart from usual academic protocol, and begin with a personal introduction. I am  here 
today because of my friendship with Paul Caringella. My meeting with  Paul was a providential 
meeting  – both our lives have been changed by it, particularly mine, just as both of our lives 
have been completely changed by our respective encounters with Rosenstock-Huessy and 
Voegelin. When I met Paul in 1995 I had just written the draft of a paper that would become 
'Philosophy, Christianity and Revolution in Eric Voegelin and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.'
1 
I had 
first read  Eric Voegelin‘s New Science of Politics  in 1974, in my second year of university, and 
he remained an important figure in my intellectual development, especially his magisterial 
reading of Greek philosophy, and Plato, and Aristotle in the second and third volumes of Order 
and History. I only came to Rosenstock-Huessy after having finished my doctorate. The paper 
‗Philosophy, Christianity and Revolution‘ was a very personal settling of accounts for me –in 
part, a farewell to Platonism and an embrace of a way of thinking that I think is one where love 
and evil as energies, rather than reason predominate, if one will, a more Judaic-Christian hybrid 
than what I think is Voegelin‘s more Platonised reading of Christianity.  Through writing that 
paper, and a chance encounter of an old  friend of Paul‘s at  a party in Santa Cruz I met Paul 
Caringella. Apart from a short essay by Page Smith  which mentioned Voegelin and Rosenstock-
Huessy, I was unaware that anyone else had an interest in both thinkers. So I was very surprised 
when I met Paul who said he had not only read Rosenstock-Huessy‘s Out of Revolution some 
twenty-five years earlier but that he introduced me to a young researcher who had just completed 
a Master‘s on Rosenstock-Huessy, and was writing a Phd on Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin.2   
He also showed me the ‗collected correspondence‘ of Eric Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy – 
two letters, consisting of Rosenstock-Huessy wanting to engage correct) Voegelin, and Voegelin 
good naturedly suggesting his admiration for Rosenstock-Huessy and the hope that they might 
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publish  Theorie, Relevanz und Wahrheit: Eine Rekonstruktion des Briefwechsels zwischen Eric Voegelin und Alfred 
Schütz (1938-1959), (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2000) 
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meet someday in the future. With the publication of the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin,  I 
have since learnt that Voegelin once wrote to Friedrich Engel-Janosi (June 5, 1944) that he was 
reluctant to give a talk to an American audience, after hearing the reaction of an American 
audience to a talk he had heard given  at Harvard by Rosenstock-Huessy.
3 
  
Rosenstock-Huessy insisted that all important thinking is responsive, and that it is the 
provocations, behest, pleas, urges, declaration of living speech that make us who we become.  
Paul has taken that very seriously – for he would not let me let go of Voegelin. And as Paul and 
Chip Hughes and I had been working on a series of conferences which took their points of 
departure from Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy, completely unknown to both of us, two other 
men whose lives were respectively changed by Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy – Norman 
Fiering and Ellis Sandoz - had decided to have a section on them here at APSA. It is these 
incalculable acts of devotion, friendship, and dialogue – which is not afraid to address difficult 
and uncomfortable differences – that are indispensable for the process of incarnating thinkers we 
feel remain invaluable as guides of future orientation.  
 
*** 
Let us state from the outset -  Rosenstock-Huessy and Voegelin have much in common. Most of 
all they share a deep conviction that modern men and women are spiritually in the greatest 
danger, from widespread social atomization, disintegration and  mechanization. Perhaps that is 
the one fundamental feature that united all Austro-German intellectuals whose thought was 
formed in the penumbra of the World Wars, irrespective  of where, or how they positioned 
themselves ideologically toward the future.  The faith of a liberal progressive like John Dewey – 
scorned publicly by Rosenstock-Huessy in The Christian Faith, and dismissed privately by 
Voegelin, who commented in  a letter  that Dewey was simply not worthy of philosophical 
refutation
4
 -  was, for the most part,  impossible.
5
 Europe had invested so much hope in science, 
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 Eric Voegelin, Selected correspondence, 1924-1949 Collected Works, vol. 29 (University of Missouri Press, 
2009), translated by William Petropulos, edited and introduced by Jurgen Gebhardt and, 403-404.  
4 
For Rosenstock-Huessy ‗s critique of Dewey see 42 ff of his The Christian Future or the Modern Mind Outrun 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966 [1946]). See Voegelin‘s letter to Francis Wilson November 19, 1957 in  Eric 
Voegelin Selected Correspondence 1950-1984, translated from the German by Sandy Adler, Thomas Hollweck, and 
William Petropulos, (University of Missouri Press, 2007), 323 -324.  
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liberty and progress and when they had failed to stave off the Great War, they found few 
philosophical champions on European soil. Unlike their Austrian and German contemporaries, 
who frequently found themselves attracted to the ideologies of Marxism and National Socialism 
(among the later was a close friend and coauthor of Rosenstock-Huessy‘s, Werner Picht, as well 
as his more famous Berlin colleague and acquaintance, Carl Schmitt), neither Rosenstock-
Huessy nor Voegelin were in the least attracted to these ideologies, though Rosenstock-Huessy 
could write somewhat more dispassionately and, even, favourably, if not uncritically, about 
Marx, without denying the terrors and stupidity of communism. If Voegelin presented Marxism, 
National Socialism and progressive liberalism as part of a common Gnostic delusion, as variant 
components of modernity‘s  spiritual deformation,   Rosenstock-Huessy was just as convinced  
that they were all false idols. Both also believed that the most important truths to humanity‘s 
health had been expressed by Christianity. But  whereas Voegelin could speak of the need to 
‗restore‘, as he put it in ‗The Gospel and Culture‘, ‗the rule of reason,‘ 6  Rosenstock-Huessy  
held that our experience of speech, history, and time gives us far more orientation (if one will, 
names for reasoning with) than reason itself.  
 Likewise, whereas Voegelin devotes a great deal of time and energy to a painstaking reading 
and defense of classical reason and will draw heavily upon classical philosophy to view our 
modern spiritual derailment, Rosenstock-Huessy could barely bring himself to speak of 
philosophy and theology without expressing disapproval in what he saw as the exaggeration of 
faith in the  powers of the mind. Yet Voegelin‘s very love of classical reason as exhibited 
particularly by Plato  is in large part due to what he sees as its inherent understanding of human 
limits and, thus also, the limits of the mind‘s grasp of reality. But this stress upon limits of 
reason, which he sees as integral to its proper deployment, only partially brings him and 
Rosenstock-Huessy into concord. For Rosenstock-Huessy – somewhat akin to Hayek‘s distrust 
of the overreliance on order understood as taxis, as opposed to the spontaneously induced order 
of catallaxy – one of the problems of classical reasoning is precisely that it is incapable of 
adequately drawing our limits. This is not because of any Gnostic faith on his part – indeed he 
says that  ‗We can overcome the new hordes who make vitality their god only with a sword 
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Hayek, who was on good terms with Voegelin,  and von Mises are notable exceptions. But their arguments, as 
different as they are from each other, do not fit into the  gnostic Gestalt which Voegelin was attacking.  
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Sandoz, 212..  
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whose steel  contains no alloy of Humanism or Gnostics‘7 -  but because of his faith in God‘s 
incalculable majesty. Being open to God‘s love means being a self that is open to the light of 
grace, and, through grace, what may be impossible one day might be possible at another time. 
And, for Rosenstock-Huessy, our temporal nature was always understood by Christianity. Thus 
he says that ‗the very essence of Christianity is historical—it is the story of man's salvation—so 
to be a Christian is to think primarily in the language of time rather than of space, as shown by 
the favorite biblical phrase, "the world to come." Christianity created true future, as we have 
seen. Christian other-worldliness actually consists of "the powers of the world to come" (Heb. 
6:5) breaking in upon the world as it has already come to be.‘8  It is in keeping with this 
emphasis upon Christianity as a process of God not only revealing Himself through time, but in 
humanity becoming conscious of his God given powers over time that Rosenstock-Huessy came 
into conflict with Karl Barth. He had been excited by the publication of Barth‘s Letter to the 
Romans, only to realize, on closer inspection, that it omitted what he thought was this temporal 
dimension that he held was so essential to Christianity. When challenged by Rosenstock-
Huessy‘s somewhat blunt criticisms, Barth responded by referring to 1 Corinthians 15 asking  
Rosenstock-Huessy whether the ―transcendent‖ powers belonging to God are meant for 
humanity. For his part Rosenstock-Huessy‘s retorted:  
Hasn‘t salvation come into the world? Hasn‘t God taken pity on us? Does Paul 
speak of the transcendent powers of new eon or of a Father who lives up there 50 
million kilometers away or does he speak of the Son of God who became man. 
Christ became flesh, thus we live in his name which is the  addressable and 
effable name of God. Thus has God revealed himself. Where‘s the transcendence 
in this?
9
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The Christian Future, 122.  The new hordes he is referring to are those moderns who ‗have enthroned the myth of 
humanity.‘  
8
 Ibid, 123. 
9
 Letter of Rosentock-Huessy to Barth, 18.11. 1919. A copy of this exists in the Rosenstock-Huessy archives in 
Bielefeld.  
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Voegelin‘s emphasis, on the other hand, is upon the human search for order and, indeed, he is 
emphatic about that order being anchored in an opening to the transcendent. Thus the following 
passage from the third volume of Order and History which is as much a description of 
Voegelin‘s own account of man and history as  a description of its classical account‖ 
The field of this history is the soul of man. Man, in his knowledge of himself, 
does not know himself only as a world-immanent existent but also as existing in 
openness toward transcendental reality; but he knows himself in this openness 
only historically in the degree of differentiation that his experiences and their 
symbolization have reached. The self-understanding of man is conditioned and 
limited by the development of his existence toward transcendence. As a 
consequence, the nature of man itself as an object of metaphysical inquiry is not 
altogether a world-immanent object; the formation of the soul through invading 
transcendence is part of that ―nature‖ that we explore in metaphysics. When the 
philosopher explores the spiritual order of the soul, he explores a realm of 
experiences that he can appropriately describe only in the language of symbols 
expressing the movement of the soul toward transcendental reality and the 
flooding of the soul by transcendence. At the border of transcendence the 
language of philosophical anthropology must become the language of religious 
symbolization.
10
  
In this respect, and allowing for their respective disagreement about the adequacy of what 
Voegelin calls the symbol of transcendence aside,  Rosenstock-Huessy and Voegelin  are at one 
in their insistence upon the importance of humanity‘s openness to God‘s grace. Where, though, 
they do differ is that in Voegelin that openness seems to be largely of an intellectual nature – 
even Voegelin‘s choice of symbols, as opposed to Rosenstock-Huessy preference for  names 
suggests that the participation Voegelin is primarily talking about is one of questioning and 
reflecting. Although, as the reference to our soul being invaded and flooded by transcendence 
our whole being may be changed in this transformation. But, again, what primarily interests him 
qua philosopher is the process of intellectually digesting the experience. Thus, to repeat, the 
language of philosophical anthropology must become the language of religious symbolization.  
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Of course, Voegelin‘s reading of transcendence is, as the above passage also indicates, 
intrinsically connected to history, and his alliance with Christianity is due, in no small part, to  
what he sees as the symbolic potency of the Christian grasp of man in history. It is precisely 
humanity‘s temporality that Voegelin stresses against the Gnostic stormers of heaven. Thus the 
very opening sentence of The New Science of Politics: ‗The existence of man in political science 
is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the same 
time be a theory of history.‘11 But for him that temporality means that we must recognize where 
we fall short, and it is this failure to understand our limits  that is behind what Voegelin 
addresses in such terms as  ‗the magic dream,‘ ‗spiritual derailment,‘  and the ‗spiritual disease‘ 
of the Gnostic metastatic faith which he sees as defining modernity. That Gnostic metastatic faith 
is an ideological faith. And modern ideologies are, as he realized as a young man, political 
religions, religions which all do away with the need for the genuine and loving God of creation 
and salvation. And, while retaining the core symbols of religion, they trade in the  limited 
horizon of a temporality severed from its transcendent telos of the eschaton.  A symbol that is 
essential  to humanity‘s spiritual health, is deformed and defaced through the substitution of the 
pseudo-telos of historical immanence, and thus what we have is a non, or butchered, reality 
posing as the ultimate reality. Thus political religions are like a virus infecting men and women 
so that they lose faith in their participation in the divine ground and put their faith in monstrously 
blood schemes of violence. 
Thus to counter the mentality behind political religions or ideologies,   Voegelin chooses as his 
frontspiece to the volumes of  Order and History, a sentence from Augustine‘s De Vera 
Religione ‗In the study of creature one should not exercise a vain and perishing curiosity but 
ascend toward what is immortal and everlasting.‘ And in, Order and History, and again in 
contrast to the ideologies, Voegelin is presenting the great symbols of that ascent. Order and 
History is, as I am suggesting, written as a reaction to the false / delusional symbolic clusters of 
ideology, which is ‗existence in rebellion against God and man.‘ ] it is the violation of the First 
and ten Commandments, if we want to use the language of Israelite order; it is the nosos, the 
disease of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus and Plato.‘12 Thus Voegelin‘s 
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The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago press,  1952, 1. 
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Order and History, vol. 1, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), xiv.  
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primary theoretical concern was with modern men and women‘s ‗spiritual derailment,‘ their 
tumult that comes from their failure to comprehend that ‗God and man, world and society form a 
primordial community of being.‘13   
This failure which is, for Voegelin,  allied to the spread of the totalitarian ideologies of the 20
th
 
century and the enlightenment faith which bred these monsters of excessive hope and stupidity 
stands in the closest to relationship to how he sees both history and his role as a political 
philosopher. Thus again from the Preface to the first volume of Order and History:  
The Logos of being is the object proper of philosophical inquiry; and the search 
for truth concerning the order of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing 
the modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has to be gained and 
regained in the perpetual struggle against the fall from it; and the movement 
toward truth starts from a man's awareness of his existence in untruth. The 
diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable in philosophy as a form of 
existence. And ever since Plato, in the disorder of his time, discovered the 
connection, philosophical inquiry has been one of the means of establishing 
islands of order in the disorder of the age.
14
 
As the quote, illustrates Voegelin sees himself as a diagnostician, and he is diagnosing the 
spiritual disease of his time.  Like a doctor the task is to bring the patient back to health. But, if I 
may continue with this analogy, because a patient has been made healthy does not mean that he 
will stave off all other diseases, including death.   
What I most want to emphasize in this brief look at Voegelin‘s understanding of history is his 
idea of the struggle between order and the fall from it, and his interest in history as an intelligible 
struggle ‗for true order.‘15  Voegelin‘s interest in Christianity stands in the closest relationship to 
his belief that this struggle is interminable  and, although, Voegelin himself is primarily a 
philosopher, he was also aware of the limits of philosophy‘s efficacy. Thus, as Paul Caringella 
drew to my attention, he addressed this in a personal letter to Manfred Henningsen:  
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 Order and History, vol. 1, 1.  
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Order and History, vol. 1, xiv.  
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Nothing has come, so to speak, of classical philosophy as a socially ordering power; 
the radical understanding of transcendence has come through Christianity, not 
through the philosophers. For most people, conversion seems to go other ways than 
that of the actualization of the nous, as is shown precisely in the cases of Paul and 
Augustine (Confessiones VIII) both of whom certainly had a sound philosophical 
schooling. . . . as Book VIII of the Confessiones demonstrates, a very intensive 
phase of zetesis to the point of despair precedes one‘s own conversion experience. 
But this Augustinian zetesis experiences itself as a hopeless striving to the point of 
despair – and precisely because the philosophical ―solutions‖ are perceived of as 
unsatisfactory.
16
 
As all readers of Voegelin also know, Voegelin sees that (Augustinian) Christianity spells out the 
true nature of the human predicament, by simultaneously tending to the need to break beyond the 
limits of our humanity, with all the suffering and injustice it entails, and by providing a Church 
in which its members together may become members of a heavenly city, while making 
eschatological fulfillment ever a beyond. The following passage from the New Science of Politics 
encapsulates what Voegelin considers to be his Christian view of society, as well as the anti-
Christian view that originates in the very bosom of Christianity:  
The soteriological truth of Christianity, then, breaks with the rhythm of existence; 
beyond temporal successes and reverses lies the supernatural destiny of man, the 
perfection through grace in the beyond. Man and mankind now have fulfillment, 
but it lies beyond nature. Again there is no eidos of history, because the 
eschatological supernature is not a nature in the philosophical, immanent sense. 
The problem of an eidos in history, hence, arises only when Christian 
transcendental fulfillment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist 
hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, 
nor do they have essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course of history as a 
whole is no object of experience; history has no eidos, because the course of 
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history extends into the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an 
illusion; and this illusionary eidos is created by treating a symbol of faith as if it 
were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience.17 
For Voegelin, then, Augustine‘s great importance was in his distinction between earthly and 
heavenly cities, and the respective loves that form each city – the hellish amor sui which dooms 
the terrestrial city to never ending disorder, and the amor dei which provides the genuine order 
which the soul is really craving. The conflict between these two loves overhangs all of 
Voegelin‘s social and political analysis, and his reading of history. Moreover, Augustine‘s 
dismissal of literal millenarianism confirms, for Voegelin,  that the genius of Augustine lay in his 
insistence on the perennial separation of mundane and providential history. Thanks to Augustine: 
‗The Logos had become flesh in Christ; the grace of redemption had been bestowed on man; 
there would be no divinization of society beyond the pneumatic presence of Christ in his 
church.‘18 The spiritual and temporal orders had been divided once and for all, while ‗In its 
temporal articulation it accepted the conditio humana without chiliastic fancies, while it 
heightened natural existence by the representation of spiritual destiny through the church.‘19  
The great disaster, then, for Voegelin of modern men and women has been that the greatest 
hardships of our natural existence which call out for spiritual solutions are multiplied out of all 
proportion by the ideological quick fixes which promise earthly redemption while delivering hell 
on earth.  Further that process which, Voegelin argues, has taken place over a thousand years, 
gained rapid acceleration with the French revolution. With the revolution, ‗the radical wave of 
Gnosticism was so strong that it permanently split the nation into the laicist half that based itself 
on the revolution and the conservative half that tried, and tries, to salvage the Christian 
tradition.‘20 
 In From Enlightenment to Revolution, John Hallowell‘s edition of outtakes from the History of 
Political Ideas, the work Voegelin had turned his back on as he sought a more adequate 
grounding of the problem that gnawed at him his whole life, Voegelin provided a powerful 
analysis of the Enlightenment‘s complicity in the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century. And 
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while he was convinced that behind the Enlightenment lay a far more archaic deformed symbolic 
‗edifice‘, in that work he lays out with compelling clarity the historical ‗ideas‘ that will do so 
much damage.  
He commences with secularized history, in which ‗transcendental universalism disintegrates 
under the impact of profane materials which cannot be related, however tenuously, to the course 
of sacred history, the universality of meaning has to degenerate into the ideal of empirical 
completeness.‘ 21 the dissolution of Man into a 
mass of pleasure pain mechanisms and the One who will manipulate the 
mechanisms for the good of society. The nature of man, by a kind of division of 
labor, is distributed among masses and leaders so that only society as a whole is 
integral man. Moreover the operations of the legislator on the members of society 
substitute, as we have seen, for grace and predestination. Society has become a 
totally closed universe with an immanent process of salvation.
22
 
 For Voegelin, Helvétius is a critical thinker in the process of deformation. Taking 
Pascal‘s view of the passions, an endless restlessness with a centre of nothingness which blocks 
out the grace of God, Helvétius devises a theory of social evolution for the happiness of the 
greatest number – and that happiness is to be achieved by the God-like surrogate of the 
legislator. With the accompanying faith in science as the accumulation of  positive facts inserted 
into the schema of progress and revolt, Christianity becomes overthrown, but only by having its 
understanding of order mis-appropriated, reconfigured in a pattern that makes revolt central to 
the human essence. With both the French and Russian revolutions Voegelin‘s concern is 
primarily the political ideas that both fuelled them and those which came out of them, and which 
continue to erode the more stable potentials for order he sees in the United States and Great 
Britain – countries whose revolutions were curtailed through the bulwarks of their residual 
Christian institutions. Although both revolutions are of fundamental importance in terms of his 
diagnosis of modernity‘s sickness, the shift from his interest in ideas to symbols, and the 
emphasis upon participation in being accompanying his interpretation of the importance of 
symbols in man‘s sense of order, Voegelin actually has very little to say about the revolutions as 
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11 
 
revolutions, especially about the  more – if I may be permitted  to use a Marxist term which is 
not inappropriate here – ‗material‘ causes, the historical socio-economic forces, as opposed to 
the ideas, behind the revolutions.  
Ultimately Voegelin‘s value is his diagnosis of false hopes and delusions, and the insight he 
brings into why the Christian and  classical traditions should not simply be dispensed with in 
favour of the modern political religions and their symbols. In particular, it was his sense of the 
importance of the relationship between God, Man, world and society, his fight against 
totalitarianism and the linkage he makes between totalitarian ‗orders‘ and the faith of the 
Enlightenment liberalism that defines  his interest in the political and that shapes his insights.  
It is not unfair to say that Voegelin‘s reading of history may be classified as ‗declinist:‘ ‗The 
corrosion of Western civilization through Gnosticism is a slow process extending over a 
thousand years - 
23
 and that he is primarily wanting to reestablish order – one in which faith and 
reason may work more powerfully because they do not take on those monstrous qualities that 
accompany them when they serve more Satanic or Gnostic goals.  
In spite of the sense of loss that runs through his work, which is why he is usually classified as a 
political conservative, there is nothing I can think of which would suggest he believes a 
restoration of  an order already lost is desirable or possible. Indeed, the task he leaves for those 
readers convinced by his analysis is to participate in finding appropriate symbols of order and 
their transcendent ground for our time. But that also means joining him in the historical journey 
of discovering the symbols of order of past worlds and the symbols of destruction or disease 
which have helped bring about their, and our, ruin.  Of course, he does think the symbols of 
order that evolve in Athens and Jerusalem can still speak to us, if we cleanse our minds from 
ideological distortions.  But our institutional environment is, for all its shortcomings and horrors, 
still ours. We have to make sense of it and work our way through it. The past still speaks to us 
and helps us in orientation but it is not simply to be rebuilt. This is also why Voegelin‘s project is 
so emphatic in its experiential emphasis, and why his Anamnesis is so central to his work. There 
he states bluntly:  ‗There is no other reality  than the one we experience,‘24 and ‗ history is the 
                                                          
23 The New Science of Politics, 188 – see also 128. 
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history of participation, and the symbols referring gto the termini of participation are indices of 
experience.‘25 And why he could appreciate the importance of a man it simply makes no sense to 
call a political conservative, Albert Camus.
26   
In some important respects, Rosenstock-Huesy can be seen as a mirror image of Voegelin. 
While, as we have said, he wants no truck with Gnosticism, his anti-transcendent view of 
Christianity is closely allied to his view of the Church as engaged in a process of anthropurgy,  
making man like God, a term and process he finds  referred to in the Athanasian creed.
27 
 Not 
surprisingly, Rosenstock-Huesy (like Dante), agrees with Voegelin that Joachim ‗heralded all the 
… revolutions of our own millennium.‘28   But, unlike Voegelin, this does not mean Rosenstock-
Huessy thinks Joachim has departed from the Christian faith – on the contrary, he adds, ‗his 
conception of progress beyond the Church depended by implication upon the existence of the 
Church, and thus his position remained Christian.‘29 Like Voegelin, Rosenstock-Huessy also sees 
himself as continuing an essentially Augustinian view of politics. He too is grateful for the 
distinction between the terrestrial and heavenly cities, and the role of the Church in assisting the 
faithful on their journey to the kingdom. Yet he believes the kingdom must come, and that 
coming is in time. Eternity, for him, in any Platonic sense as simply beyond time, is a mistaken 
notion, which fails to understand that the Christian appeal is to a future kingdom that is God‘s 
promise.  Redemption involves redemption of God‘s creation thus it is a redemption that can 
only take place in and through time. And this redemption has been taking place throughout the 
Christian Age. Thus Rosenstock-Huessy‘s enthusiastic endorsement of Burckhardt‘s assessment 
of the Greeks, which  certainly highlights the tension between him and Voegelin, also makes the 
point that the Christian faith is a process of redeeming what is valuable for human kind and its 
mission is incarnational.  
Jacob Burckhardt never became tired of showing that Greek thinkers could not 
change the slightest little thing in antiquity. There was no superstition lacking; 
thinkers name no children. They thought of the good, the beautiful, the divine, the 
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29 Ibid., 75.  
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true as ideas, with the transformation through times and spaces of mankind. Only 
1500 years later, after the word again had become flesh and the four acts of 
incarnation had rolled by, thus not until the Renaissance of Greek thinkers from 
1500 to 1900 did the books of the Greek ―thinkers‖ live as forceful political 
movements. Because the word was in the position to become flesh, modern 
political forms were able to emerge out of Greek thought.
30
 
For Rosenstock-Huessy, it is not so much the search for order that leads us to look to history. 
Indeed the search for order does not really concern Rosenstock-Huessy at all – order is always 
temporary, the Holy Spirit is a moving spirit, just as God Himself announces Himself by being 
always Here one step ahead. His concern with history is with the search for love.  This is his 
Augustinianism, a connection he draws explicitly near the conclusion of his Soziologie:  
The scores of this composition, the histories, must be paraphrased in so many 
editions as there are generations (Geschlechter) of humankind. For the 
composition is recomposed in each generation by those whose love overcomes a 
murder or a death.  
So history becomes a great song, Augustine‘s Carmen Humanum; in its every 
line, perhaps every tone, becomes a lived human life. As soon and as often as the 
lines rhyme, love has once again become stronger than death. Then from out of 
absurd contingencies, from adverse circumstances, from silent events of epoch-
making necessities, in which a lengthy ingested illness is finally confronted, 
crossfertilized (eingekreuzt) and consequently overcome.31 
Though, as Paul Caringella reminded me in an earlier draft of this paper, in Anamnesis 
Voegelin cites Augustine‘s Enarrationes in Psalmos: ‗They begin to leave who begin to 
love. Many are  leaving unbenownst, For the feet of those leaving are the affections of the 
heart: And yet, they are leaving Babylon‘, adding that Augustine‘s classification of ‗the 
conflicts between the Chosen People and the empires under the symbol  of exodus and 
                                                          
30 
Ja und Nein, 40. Of course Rosenstock-Huessy is well aware of the flows of Plato and Aristotle in 
the Christian tradition prior to the Renaissance – but here he is talking of their moving beyond 
the Church and its institutions.   
31 Soziologie 2, p. 759. 
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understands the historical processes of exodus an, exile and return as figurations of the 
tension between time and eternity.‘ While Voegelin is emphasizing eternity of as the end 
of the journey, he, nevertheless, emphasizes that the exodus may adopt  ‗a real emigration 
from society or …a collision within society between representatives of higher and lower-
ranking orders.‘32 
In contrast to Voegelin, whose search for order was originally conceived as an examination of 
the imperial organizations of the Ancient near east, the experience of the Israelites, the polis, the 
Alexandrian empire and the modern national states and their Gnostic underpinnings,
33
 
Rosenstock-Huessy‘s search for the love that overcomes death leads  him to analyze the tribes, 
empires (mostly Egypt but also Mesopotamia, Rome and China), the city states, the Israelites and 
Christianity as the power which is able to reinvigorate and reconfigure – i.e. redeem - what is 
still living  in each of these forms of life. What is striking in his analysis of these fundamental 
social forms – and again Paul drew this to my attention -  in its similarity to Voegelin is that he 
plots the move from one form to another as a process of exodus.   
It is his reading of history as a process of periodic and necessary exoduses  that also led him to 
argue that the Church, having unified most of Europe by the end of the first millennium, had 
created the social foundations for what would become  a sequence of revolutions, whose effects 
would circulate throughout Europe and eventually the world– the investiture conflict, or what he 
calls the papal revolution, the Italian revolution, or the Renaissance, the German revolution, or 
the Reformation, the English revolution, and even the French revolution and Russian revolutions 
– the anti-Christianity of the latter two coming from the failures of the Catholic Church in France 
and the Orthodox Church in Russia  to adequately respond to the ‗cries to heaven‘ of those 
suffering sufficiently to want to tear down their entire social, political and religious order and 
leap into a  future ostensibly free from earthly misery and injustice. If Rosenstock-Huessy sets 
himself the task of identifying the valuable effects of what comes ‗out of revolution‘, this does 
not change the fact that, no less than Voegelin, Rosenstock-Huessy sees revolutions and wars as 
disease. Indeed he says this explicitly.
34
  But, unlike Voegelin, he sees disease as sometimes a 
                                                          
32 Anamnesis, 337.  
33 Order and History, Vol. 1, x.  
34 See  chapter 1 of his Origin of Speech.  
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necessary condition which we must go through to achieve a fuller consciousness and activation 
of our powers.  
 Now whereas, as we have seen, history for Voegelin is primarily about the struggle between 
order and disorder, a struggle which, Voegelin suggests, makes it useless to speak of progress –a 
mundane concept that perverts the transcendent  nature of the eschaton – for Rosenstock-Huessy 
progress is not a secular term but  a Christian one, indeed one which is perverted if it is 
completely severed from its Christian  roots. In a passage which simultaneously embraces what 
Voegelin rejects while also affirming much of Voegelin‘s analysis, he writes:  
The idea of progress was not invented in 1789 or 1492. Jesus promised that his 
followers would do greater works than he had done (Jn. 14:12). The Church 
Fathers championed progress as the Christian view in opposition to the pagan 
belief in cycles of fate, with the golden age lying in the past; they proclaimed 
'the resurrection of life and love after and through suffering, whereby God 
himself made progress in the hearts of the faithful…. 
The  distinctively modern idea of progress is hardly older than the eighteenth 
century, when men like Condorcet, in his Les progres de I'esprit humain cut loose 
from the preceding centuries of religious continuity and set up a purely secular 
humanitarian ideal. The human spirit replaced the Holy Spirit. Emancipation from 
Christian traditions seemed at the time to promise unbounded possibilities—but 
the lack of guarantees for any such assumption has haunted all the secular 
philosophies of history from that day to this.
35
 
Progress is not automatic – indeed, ‗[b]elief in automatic progress … stops progress.‘36  Nor does 
it mean, for Rosenstock-Huessy, that we may not find ourselves serving time in hell. On the 
contrary, Out of Revolution was, by Rosenstock-Huessy‘s own account, written out of the 
experience of the hell of the First World War. What he means by progress and the steps involved 
are spelled out by him as follows:  
                                                          
35 Ibid, 75-76.  
36 Ibid., 80.  
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Progress, then, includes the following steps: 1. A certain level of common 
decency is accepted as "natural" for some time. 2. A fall into barbarism, a 
suspension of all standards by one individual or group shocks us. Standards 
hitherto considered safe are threatened. 3. We reconsider our human state. Unable 
to understand such a deep fall, we try to delve deeper into the secret of our nature. 
We find some leak in our former conception of justice. 4. The next peace after the 
fall reflects a more complete insight into man's true nature. It organizes us in such 
a manner that we will fall less deep next time.
37
 
What Rosenstock-Huessy is saying here is that Christianity understood that man can learn from 
his ‗sins.‘ An important illustration of the point that Rosenstock-Huessy is making can be gauged 
from how the trauma of the Second World War carved in humanity a greater sense of the 
sinfulness of racism. Of course, this neither prevents new sins breaking out and new disasters 
happening. Moreover, from Rosenstock-Huessy‘s perspective, it is precisely when we fail to 
learn from our suffering that we are condemned to repeat it. He repeatedly made the point that 
the  failure to find a proper peace, and the scapegoating of the Germans by the allies combined 
with the Germans‘ failure to move beyond their infatuation with statism and nationalism, helped 
create the conditions for Hitler. Rosenstock-Huessy‘s observation that ‗resurrection has its severe 
laws. A wounded heart does not recover in the spiritual world without a change in the visible 
world,‘38 somewhat understates precisely what happened when a wounded people were simply 
left in their injury and resentment.  
The failure or refusal to love the neighbor is explosive. And I think the importance of the 
significance of this failure or refusal is something that plays a far greater role in Rosenstock-
Huessy than Voegelin. As in Augustine, evil, in Rosenstock-Huessy,  is closely bound up with 
love – evil is misdirected love, failed love, and that misdirected love leaves its residues in the 
world.  Societies/ social forms become toxic or corrosive through the accretion of failed/ 
misdirected loves. Augustine and Rosenstock-Huessy (and Voegelin) are also typically Christian 
in making self-love the common form of misdirected love. Thus a group or class which only 
serves its own interest finds itself creating toxicity around it and eventually that toxicity will 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 82.  
38 Ibid,145. 
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poison the whole social body. Revolutions and wars, when seen thus, are the consequences of 
love‘s failure. To be indifferent to the suffering of others is to create hatred of an order. In his 
diagnosis of the total revolutions of Europe, which he argues form an historically sequential set 
of solutions to the various socially imposed limitations and obstacles to our neighbourliness and 
to our realization of our own inner divine likeness, Rosenstock-Huessy pauses upon how the 
traumas and wounds of the past incubate and reappear with appalling ferocity to help bring down 
a social order. A good example of this is in his diagnosis of the French Revolution. There he 
writes about how the failure of the University of Paris to respond to the legitimate  grievances of 
Christian humanists and reformers, and  how, through its pride in past glories, it was locked into 
an earlier set of needs, and  names, and behaviours bound up with its privileged position as the 
educator of Europe. Its complicity in the slaughter of the Huguenots would be fateful for the 
Catholic Church. Though those involved in that massacre would not know that they were digging 
the grave of the Church and helping creating the non-Christian humanism which both Voegelin 
and Rosenstock-Huessy see as a modern curse.  The response of the monarchy to the 
intransigence of the University of Paris was to draw the French nobility of out of  les pays and 
the clergy far more into closely into its political orbit,  and, eventually, to abandon Paris. This 
was to prove politically disastrous for the two estates which seemed to most benefit from this 
maneuver. Likewise, the broader explosions of the religious wars (which played no small role in 
the English revolution) and the Thirty Years War created the basis for modern humanism. For it 
was that experience that created a new class of intellectuals who no longer had any faith in 
traditional Christian symbols. Rosenstock-Huessy‘s examination  of that loss of faith and the 
new faiths erected by the philosophes in France show that he is no less critical of their blindness 
to  the history of the Church than Voegelin. Nor is he less critical of the idolatrous creations of 
that revolution than Voegelin, particularly nationalism, faith in science and art, with the 
accompanying cult of the genius and novelty. The heritage of the French revolution is  all too 
conspicuous today in a world in which everybody is a member of the nation state,  most have the 
‗news‘ as part of their daily diet of, and look to art rather than  religion for spiritual nourishment. 
Yet, he also sees that that the fall outs of that revolution were not only bad – he gives particular 
emphasis to the granting of political rights to the Jews, while noting that the Dreyfus affair only 
revealed how precarious  those rights were and thus how its  messianism – like all political 
messianisms – had to come up against the harsh limits of its own local pressures. But most 
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importantly, while his study of revolutions is premised upon what he sees as the indisputable fact 
that the great revolutions of Europe culminate in the two World Wars (the Russian revolution, 
for him, being a byproduct of the First World War), he is also convinced that these wars have 
forced us into ever greater potential association. The consequence of the sequence of total 
revolutions is the enforced recognition that we inhabit one world, and that is reinforced by the 
administrative, technological, economic and commercial, legal and political systems. These are 
part of the globalization process and they have their sources in the total revolutions and world 
wars. This, for Rosenstock-Huesy, is why history is a Heilsgeschichte and is providential – not 
because of any particular goodness on the part of Western men and women – on the contrary, 
Rosenstock-Huessy‘s view of man is utterly Augustinian, we are fallen creatures. But, to put it 
theologically, it is God‘s providence that weaves us into a common or universal history.  
 Conclusion 
While Rosenstock-Huessy defends a Heilsgeschichte, at the centre of his interpretation of 
Christianity   is the triadic interplay of suffering, sacrifice and love. Christianity had discovered 
that sacrifice of the self is bound up with the recognition of death as a precondition for further 
life. Thus Christianity enters into the role of the victim and instead of fleeing  suffering is 
prepared to make of one‘s suffering a sacrificial gift to the future. The typical pagan move,  as 
the work of René Girard in particular has shown, is to find a victim to be the social sacrifice. 
Thus typical pagan myth (and I think ever before Girard‘s eyes is the pagan revival and practice 
of Nazism)  requires a sacrifice for the restoration of peace, the end of a plague, or the cessation 
of a violent contagion. The Christian sees this act as a failure to understand what God really 
wants – our love and the cessation of such violence. But until we realize this we endlessly repeat 
this interplay. In so far as we enable souls around us to rot and suffer  our society/ world is 
breeding the damage which will return as the revenge of the repressed.  
If Voegelin‘s genius was to scrutinize how modern men and women have locked themselves into 
a deformed symbolic order,  an order which promised total freedom yet only intensified their 
spiritual despair, Rosenstock-Huessy‘s was  to try and show us God‘s providence at work in our 
history, to point to the gifts that have been bestowed by the sacrificial suffering of earlier 
generations. To say this is not to incite revolution – Rosenstock-Huessy is not a revolutionary. It 
is, however, to say, that in being heirs to the creations that have emerged from great suffering 
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and sacrifice, we should not take those liberties and pools of peace we have for granted. We also 
need to be aware of the injured, wounded and sick hearts among us, and the dangers of 
squandering the peace, which is also the failure to work with the wounded among us. And now, 
as Rosenstock-Huessy has emphasized, the ‗us‘ is planetary, is everywhere, and there are plenty 
of ‗us‘ today whose rancor is as real as ‗our‘ wounds.  
